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BOOK REVIEWS
ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE: THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLES OF RULES AND Dis-
CRETION. By Milton Handler. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957. Pp.
vi, 151. $3.00.
Columbia University Press has rendered a service to all students of American
antitrust policy by the publication of this little book which records three lectures
delivered by Professor Handler in 1956 in the University of Buffalo School of
Law under the auspices of The James McCormick Mitchell Fund. The author has
revised the lectures to take into account the recent decision of the Supreme Court
in the da Pont-General Motors case.'
In the first of the three lectures, Professor Handler attempts to illuminate the
basic contours of modern antitrust law by comparing and contrasting divergent
constructions of the Sherman Law by Justices Peckham, White, Taft, Holmes,
Brandeis, and Stone. In only 25 pages we are provided with an excellent study of
the specific content which the Supreme Court has given to the general statement
of the policy of maintaining competition that Congress borrowed from the com-
mon law and applied to interstate and foreign commerce in 1890. Professor
Handler clearly demonstrates that the development of antitrust law has been
more orderly than a superficial study of the major cases might suggest. In the
concluding paragraph of the first lecture he says: "Those who naively expect a
complex Jurisprudence to spring full-panoplied from the brain of a lawgiver or
who woald have the law proceed in a straight line, like a guided missile, from
initial premise to ultimate solution, may find this tortuous development uninspired
and unrewarding.' ' Although the development of antitrust law may appear tortu-
ous, Professor Handler's book will enable the student of the law to retrace its
path with ease.
In the second and third lectures, the author compares the legislative standard
provided in the Clayton Act with the "rule of reason" evolved in the administra-
tion of the Sherman Law. The second lecture considers the interpretation of
section 3, and the last lecture section 7, of the Clayton Act.
Professor Handler concludes that by the construction given the Clayton Act
provisions with respect to exclusive dealing in the Standard Stations case "...
the 'substantial lessening of competition' standard is reduced to the level of a
per se invalidation of exclusives save in de minhmis situations."3 He points out
that Justice Frankfurter's reluctance to have legality turn on a conjecture about
the probable effects of alternative business practices did not require "his flight to
the opposite extreme," since the "ordinary skill of their calling" would suffice for
judges to ascertain whether exclusive dealing contracts which exclude competitors
"from a substantial number of outlets may seriously handicap them in their com-
petition," or whether "suitable channels are open to them in adequate number."
As an economist rather than a lawyer, this reviewer concurs with Professor
Handler's dissatisfaction with the "quantitative substantiality" test of illegality,
but takes issue with his tendency in this context to view substantial lessening of
competition in terms of injury to competitors rather than in terms of overall
market performance. Handler says: "If there is a reasonable likelihood of injury
to competitors by preventing them from reaching the ultimate consumer, the
practice should not be countenanced. Otherwise, it should be sanctioned as com-
patible with the underlying philosophy of antitrust." The underlying philosophy
of antitrust is not an ambiguous philosophy on which a consensus exists. Much
1. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
2. Page 28.
3. Page 37.
4. Page 38.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
of the current controversy over antitrust policy seems to stem from the dual goal
of protecting "competitors" from injury and protecting the public from so much
centralization of control in a particular segment of economic activity that de-
cisions which benefit private interest [is served by decisions Nvhich] adversely
affect the interest of the public [interest]. The latter danger may be made pos-
sible by business practices which do not injure any competitor. This is particu-
larly true in merger cases. In this writer's opinion, injury to competitors should
not be made a basis for illegality under the Clayton Act except insofar as it
results in injury to competition in the sense of a tendency to create conditions in
which monopoly power is enhanced.
With respect to the meaning of the amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
Professor Handler says:
The best that can be said about this legislative history is that it is ob-
scure, ambiguous, and inconclusive. The weight of the evidence, I submit, re-
quires the measurement of the potential anticompetitive effects of an acqui-
sition in the industry generally and not a quantitative measurement of the
amount of disappearing competition.5
This reviewer is in agreement with this conclusion, but "potential anticom-
petitive effects" are not easy to define and even more difficult to measure in
particular cases. Professor Handler says:
Taking the pending Section 7 cases as a whole, it is difficult to discern
any golden thread running through them. The complaints disclose no unify-
ing theme. They merely exhibit the idiosyncratic approaches of different
pleaders .... The line of commerce in which competition has allegedly been
impaired is rarely defined with any explicitness. What is more, very few of
the complaints describe in meaningful detail the economic strength of the
acquiring and acquired companies or adequately explain the competitive
texture of the affected markets. Hence the two basic questions-the bound-
aries of the relevant market and the existence of competitive injury in that
market-are not put into sharp focus.'
Rather than being the fault of the Justice Department, this lack of focus
seems to arise from the nature of the problem. Lines of commerce cannot be
explicity defined simply because markets do not in fact have clear-cut boundaries
either with respect to the spatial or temporal extension, or the definition of the
product. This reviewer agrees with Professor Handler that section 7 should not
be reduced to a per se prohibition, but the economic analysis required for the sort
of implementation called for by the law will necessitate significant developments
in the economists' tools of analysis.
This book should not only prove most useful to readers who approach it with
considerable knowledge of antitrust law, but for others these lectures along with
the specific references provided in the notes should provide an excellent introduc-
tion to the subject.
DAVID D. MARTINt
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6. Page 66.
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